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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit for recovery of damages for personal
injuries and resulting damages sustained by plaintiff
Matthew C. Harris (and his father, plaintiff Gary

s.

Harris)

when the jeep in which Matthew was riding collided with a
Utah Transit Authority bus.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
Following trial by jury, a verdict was rendered in
favor of defendants finding them not negligent.
was entered accordingly.

Judgment

Plaintiffs made a Motion for a

New Trial, which Motion was denied by the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants Matthew

c.

Harris and Gary S. Harris seek

reversal of the trial court's Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 7, 1977, at approximately 8:15 a.m., at the
T-intersection of 1700 North on Washington Blvd., in North
Ogden, Utah, a collision occurred betweeen a jeep, driven
by Rodney

c.

Talbot, and a Utah Transit Authority (U.T.A.)

bus, driven by defendant Lester Lorenzo Loosemore (550,
552, 629-30). 1
Plaintiff Matthew Harris was 17 years of age and was
riding as a passenger in the Jeep which was being driven

1

References to the Record are indicated by parenthetical page numbers.
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by Rodney C. Talbot (547, 665).

Matthew was riding in the

outside passenger seat of the Jeep (547).

Another boy, Kevin

Della Lucia, was· sitting between Matthew and Talbot (547).
The boys were on an errand for their high school teacher
(546).

The jeep was in good mechanical condition and the

day was dry and clear (548).

The jeep was travelling with

the flow of traffic, between 40 and 50 m.p.h. (521, 549,
567, 577, 591, 728).
Washington Boulevard, at the point of the collision,
has four traffic lanes, two northbound and two southbound
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1).

The impact occurred in the

outside, southbound lane (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1).
The U.T.A. bus was stopping, or had just stopped, to
pick up a passenger, when the collision occurred (561).
The U.T.A. bus was positioned with its right outer wheel
four inches off the pavement (514, Plaintiffs' Exhibits
Nos. 3-16).

The bus obstructed a substantial part of the

outside travel lane (629).
There was a shoulder of packed road-base adjacent to
the roadway (518).

The condition of this shoulder was such

that on the day of the accident, a bus could have pulled off
the roadway onto the shoulder (503, 518-19, 624-25). 2
2

Police photographs clearly illustrate the accident scene
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 3-16). Other photographs
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 1, 17-20), and a scale diagram
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2) further illustrate the scene.
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Talbot, driver of the jeep, did not recall seeing the bus
ahead of him until just before the collision (558).

At that

time, he looked up and saw the bus, glanced at his rear-view
mirror, swerved left and braked to avoid the bus (550, 558).
In the course of this maneuver, the right side of the
Jeep struck the left rear corner of the bus in such a way
as to pinch the right arm of Matthew Harris between the bus
and the Jeep, effectively severing the arm between the
shoulder and elbow, with resulting severe and permanent
injuries (535, 660-61, 668-75).

Matthew has no recollection

of the collision whatsoever (667).
During trial, the court excluded an exhibit offered
by plaintiffs, which showed the repair history, subsequent
to the date of the accident, of the involved Utah Transit
Authority bus (698-700).
The court ruled that Rodney Talbot, driver of the
Jeep in which plaintiff Matthew Harris was a passenger, was
negligent as a matter of law, but submitted the issue of
Loosemore's negligence to the jury (253).

The court denied

plaintiff's motion that the court find defendant Loosemore
negligent as a matter of law (817).
The case was submitted to a jury, which returned its
verdict finding that defendants were not negligent (235).

•

Judgment was entered on the verdict (406).

Plaintiffs moved

,_

for a new trial, which was denied (407, 476) •

ne1
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
RODNEY TALBOT WAS NEGLIGENT
The court ruled that Rodney Talbot was negligent as a
matter of law, and so instructed the jury (253).

The court

could only make such a ruling if it determined that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of Talbot's negligence.

Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219,

134 P.567 (1913).
However, there was substantial evidence in the record
which, if believed, could have pursuaded reasonable minds
that Talbot was not negligent.

Such evidence on this issue

consisted, in part, of the following.
There was substantial evidence that there were no tail
lights or signals operating on the rear of the bus immediately prior to the accident.

Police Chief Earl Carroll

(504-05), Rodney Talbot (551), Kevin Della-Lucia (568), Helen
Hollingshead (578), Robert Freston (588) and Gloria Myers
(593, 594) all observed the rear of the bus either immediately before the accident, or within minutes thereafter.
All testified either that they recalled no lights, or that
they specifically looked for lights on the bus and saw none.
No witness saw lights on the bus at the time of the accident or immediately thereafter.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Additionally, plaintiffs' Exhibits No. 40 and 41,
received in evidence, were the relevant maintenance records
of the involved bus for the time period prior to the accident, and a summary thereof (218-19).

These exhibits showed

that the involved bus had experienced several electrical
failures in the lighting and related systems prior to the
accident.
Emmett Quinn, an expert in the field of accident reconstruction, testified that, absent stop signal lights, the
only way Talbot would perceive that the bus was stopping
was the increasing size of the bus, i.e., the increasing
portion of Talbot's "cone of perception" taken by the bus
(738) •. Quinn testified that until Talbot was relatively
close to the bus, it would not appear to him to be stopping
(738, 750).

At the point Talbot perceived that the bus was

stopping it had suddenly become three times larger in his
"cone of percept ion" (737).

Quinn testified that the very

purpose of tail lights is to warn a person in the rear of a
slowing or stopping maneuver ( 7 38) •

Without such lights, a

slowing or stopping maneuver is very difficult to perceive
until the driver in the rear is relatively close to the·
stopping vehicle (738, 750).

In fact, Quinn testified that

from the point where Talbot perceived the bus and reacted,
he made the best possible effort to avoid the accident
(740-41).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition to the foregoing evidence, reasonable minds
could have decided that, under the circumstances of this
case, Talbot was not negligent simply because he may have
momentarily looked away from the road.
Utah law requires that a vehicle have operating rear
stop signal lights. 3 Additionally, Utah Law requires that a
vehicle not stop upon the paved part of the highway when it
is practical to stop off such paved part of ·the highway. 4
While there was some evidence from which it could be
inferred that the tail lights on the bus were operating,
for purposes of testing the propriety of a directed finding
of negligence against Talbot we must look at any evidence
which would contradict or prevent such a finding.

In that

regard, as discussed above, there was substantial evidence
that there were no bus tail lights operating at the time of
the accident.
As the purpose of requiring stop signal lights is to
prevent just the type of accident which happened in this
case, it follows that without stop signal lights, these
3

4

Section 41-6-121.10, Utah Code Ann. (1953); Instruction No. 12 (251).
Section 41-6-101, Utah Code An. (1953); Instruction
No. 11 (249-50).
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types of accidents can happen without any negligence on the
part of the driver to the rear.
Similarly, there was substantial evidence that Loosemore
could have pulled the bus completely off the roadway. 5 The
purpose of requiring a stopped vehicle to pull completely off
the roadway is to prevent just the type of accident which
occurred here.

It follows that where a vehicle fails to pull

off the roadway as required, and where that vehicle has no
tail lights, these type of accidents can happen without any
negligence on the part of the driver in the rear. 6 In
this regard, Loosemore testified that he never saw the jeep
5

Loosemore himself testified that on prior occassions
he had pulled off the roadway at that point farther
than he did at the time of accident (624). He testified that photographs taken at the scene showed that
he could have pulled off the road 10 more feet (625).
He testified that he stopped 3-4 feet from the waiting
passenger (627). He stopped where it would be convenient
for the passenger, rather than at a designated stopping
area (139).
Rudolph Limpert, accident reconstruction expert, testified that if the bus had pulled off even two additional
feet, the accident would not have occurred (328).
Officer Cragen testified similarly (529).
Chief Carroll (503), Officer Cragen (518), and several
others testified that there was room on the shoulder
for the bus to have pulled completely off the roadway.
In fact, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 shows a fire truck
parked on the shoulder next to the bus.

6

This is particularly true, where, as here, the road
was posted for 50 m.p.h., was straight~ and had no
semaphores or stop signs for several miles (529).

-
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behind him prior to stopping, and that he had just stopped
when he heard the screaching of brakes (629).

He knew that

his bus obstructed a substantial part of its lane (629).
Finally, Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines, 18 Utah
2d 1, 414 P.2d 88 (1966), demonstrates that negligence
should not have been directed by the court in this case.
Stapley involves nearly identical facts to the instant
case.

The day was clear1 the bus stopped with the right

wheels about one foot off the highway: the bus could have
pulled off farther onto a gravel and dirt shoulder, but did
not do so for the convenience of the boarding passengers1
any tail signal was obscured by dirt: and plaintiff, a
passenger in the following car, was injured in a rear end
collision with the bus.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a

jury verdict for plaintiff, stating:
[W]e think the competent admissible evidence
favorable to the victor, as abstracted above,
was such as justified reasonable men to
arrive at the verdict. This certainly is not
factually the strongest case in the world.
We are constrained to believe we would have
sustained a verdict for defendant, if it had
been rendered. But under our rules of
appellate review, where the jury is arbiter
of the facts, negligence, contributory
negligence, cause of the injury, and the
like, we decide this case as we do.
414 P.2d at 89 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Stapley case squarely holds that under nearly
identical facts the jury, not the court, should decide the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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facts, negligence and contributory negligence.

It was there-

fore error for the court to have directed negligence against
Talbot.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED DEFENDANT
LOOSEMORE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
As discussed in Point I, infra, the jury was properly
the arbiter of the facts and negligence.

However, the court

ruled Talbot negligent as a matter of law, and the evidence
of Loosemore's negligence was at least as strong as Talbot's.
Therefore, as the court ruled Talbot negligent, it should
have also ruled Loosemore negligent.

Plaintiffs moved the

court for such a finding at the conclusion of defendants'
evidence, which motion was denied (817).
Several statutes set the standard of care required of
Loosemore.

Those dealing with pulling off the highway are

discussed above.
In General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440,
243 P.2d 433 (1952), the court discussed the statute requiring stopping off the highway, stating that it applied to
those "cases where the driver stops his car on the highway
from his own choice and has an opportunity to select the
place and conditions of his stop." 243 P.2d at 434.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Many reported cases deal with statutes of other states
which are identical in wording with 541-6-101, Utah Code
Ann. (1953).

For e~~mple, Chard v. Bowen, 427 P.2d 568,

572 (Idaho 1967), discusses those factors which might excuse
compliance with the statute, stating:
To prove that a violation of a statute
was excusable or justifiable so as to overcome
the presumption of negligence, the evidence
must support a finding that the violation
resulted from causes or things that made
compliance with the statute impossible, something over which-the person charged with the
violation had no control which placed his
vehicle in a position violative of the statute,
or an emergency not of such person's own making by reason of which he fails to obey the
statute, and that the person who violated the
statute did what might reasonably be expected
of a person of ordinary prudence who desired
to comply with the law, acting under similar
circumstances. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
Certainly in the instant case there was no evidence of
the factors indicated in Chard which might excuse compliance
with the statute.

Therefore, a directed finding of negli-

gence was appropriate.
The same conclusion was reached in Kelly v. Montoya,
47 0

P.

2d 5 63 , 5 6 6 ( N. M • 19 7 0 ) :
Since it is foreseeable that blocking
the highway may cause other persons to have
accidents, a violation of the statute which
prohibits such blocking is negligence per se.

There is no question that Loosemore could have pulled
off the roadway the two additional feet which would have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prevented this accident.

His failure to do so, in violation

of the statute in question, was sufficient for a directed
finding of negligence, particularly when such a finding was
made as to Talbot.
Additionally, Loosemore violated his duty to keep a
lookout for persons, or other vehicles reasonably to be
seen. 7
Loosemore testified that by using his mirrors he could
see all traffic

behind him.

Yet he testified that he

failed to see Talbot's Jeep (629-30).
Somehow he did see the light-colored station wagon
next in line behind the Jeep, but he did not see Freston's
pickup truck, Myers' car, or any of the cars behind Myers
(618).

Certainly Loosemore's failure to at least see the

vehicle first affected by his maneuver, i.e. the Jeep,
demonstrates negligence on his part in failing to keep a
proper lookout.
The evidence of Loosemore's failure to keep a proper
lookout, and failure to pull off the roadway when he could
have done so, is at least as compelling for a directed
finding of negligence as a evidence regarding Talbot, and
the court erred in refusing to so rule.
7

Instruction to the Jury No. 11 (249-50) states this
duty.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 IMPROPERLY LED THE
JURY TO ITS CONCLUSION
Instruction No. 14 (253) states in part:
To be an independent intervening cause that
would relieve another's negligence from being a
proximate cause, it must be negligence that was
not foreseeable.
In that regard, you are instructed that the
driver of the Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent
as a matter of law, and if you find that he
observed the bus stopped upon the highway, or,
under the circumstances should have observed the
bus, but because of his negligence failed to do so
in time to avoid the accident, then you are
instructed that the negligence on his part was the
sole proximate cause of the collision.
(Emphasis added).
This instruction deals with both negligence and proximate cause.

Certainly those two issues are difficult for a

juror to separate.
The cited portion of Instruction No. 14 leaves a juror
with no reasonable alternative but to find Talbot solely
liable.

It holds Talbot negligent, and adds that if he

should have seen the bus, but negligently failed to do so in
time to avoid the accident, then he is solely liable.
That statement of the law was expressly rejected in
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d
287 (1953):
In applying the test of foreeseability to
situations where a negligently created pre-existing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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condition combines with a later act of negligence
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clearcut distinction between two classes of cases. The
first situtation is where one has negligently cri='
ated a dangerous condition [such as parking the
truck] and a later actor observed, or circumstances
are such that he could not fail to observe, but
negligently failed to avoid it. The second
situation involves conduct of a later intervening
actor who negligently failed to observe the
dangerous condition until it is too late to avoid
it. In regard to the first situation it is held
as a matter of law that the later intervening act
does interrupt the natural sequence of events and
cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the
initial actor. This is based upon the reasoning
that it is not reasonably to be foreseen nor
expected that one who actually becomes cognizant
of a dangerous condition in ample time to avert
injury will fail to do so. On the other hand,
with respect to the second situation, where the
second actor fails to see the danger in time to
avoid it, it is held that a jury question exists,
based on the rationale that it can reasonably be
anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein
others may not observe the dangerous condition
until too late to escape it. The distinction is
basically one between a situation in which the
second actor has sufficient time, after being
charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it,
and one in which the second actor negligently
becomes confronted with an emergency situation.
263 P.2d at 292 (emphasis added).
The court's instructions hold Talbot soley liable if he
"should have observed the bus", a negligence standard.

Hill-

yard specifically rejects that conclusion in its "second situation", cited above, where the second actor negligently failed
to observe the dangerous condition until too late to avoid it.
Hillyard was recently reaffirmed in Watters v. Querry,
588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978).

In Watters, the trial court gave

an instruction similar to Instruction No. 14 in this case:

-13-
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If a driver creates a dangerous condition with
a motor vehicle, but this condition is such that
another driver, exercising reasonable care, should
have observed and avoided the dangerous condition,
then the negligence of the later driver is an independent intervening cause, and therefore the first
driver cannot be a proximate cause of the collision.
588 P.2d at 703.
.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the above instruction to be error.

Watters required a clear instruction to

the jury of the possibility that the first actor:
should have foreseen that, in traffic such
as there was on that highway, some momentarily
inattentive driver following her would not be able
to react and brake quick enough to avoid collision
with her car or the car behind hers.
Hillyard and Watters were recently reaffirmed in Jensen
v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., No. 16417 (Utah 1980),
in which the Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for
defendant, stressing the presence of a jury issue of
foreseeability.
Concededly Instruction No. 14 presents some foreseeability issues to the jury.

However, it erroneously does so

in the context of holding Talbot negligent as a matter of
law, and it uses language rejected in Hillyard and Watters.
Instruction No. 14 left the jury no choice but to find Talbot
solely liable, which is the effect of their decision.
Plaintiffs' submitted their proposed Jury Instruction
No. 30 (354, 356), correctly stating the law in this regard,
which the court rejected.
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POINT IV
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, WERE
IMPROPER OR INCOMPLETE, AND OVER-EMPHASIZED
DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE.
A.

The court held Talbot negligent as a matter of

law, but failed to instruct the jury that such negligence
was in no way imputed to or attributable to plaintiff
Matthew Harris, passenger in Talbot's Jeep.

Caperon v.

Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 P.2d 402 (1941)1 Hudson v. Union
Pac. R.R., 120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357 (1951)1 Nyman v. Cedar
City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961)1 Hall v. Blackham,
18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966).

Such instruction was

requested by plaintiffs in their proposed Instruction No.
21 (343).
B.

There was no evidence of negligence on the part

of plaintiff Matthew Harris.

Plaintiffs requested that the

court rule as a matter of law that Matthew Harris was not
negligent, and to so instruct the jury in plaintiffs' proposed Instructions No. 1 and 21 (321-22, 343).

The court

gave no such instruction.

c.

The court instructed the jury regarding defen-

dants' theory of the case in Instruction No. 14 (253).
However, the court failed to instruct the jury as to plaintiffs' theory as requested in plaintiffs proposed Instruction No. 1 (321-22).
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D.

Although the court ruled that Talbot was negli-

gent as a matter of law, it did not instruct the jury to
disregard the fact that Talbot was not a defendant in the
case.

Plaintiffs requested such an instruction in plain-

tiffs' proposed Instruction No. 20 (342).
E.

In questioning of several witnesses defendants'

counsel elicited testimony that even though the bus blocked
one southbound lane, a second southbound lane was unobstructed
(For example, 532-33, 559-60).

Such testimony could have

been interpreted by the jury to have lessened or negated
Loosemore's duty to have pulled completely off the roadway
if practical to do so.

In fact Loosemore's duty was in no

way lessened by such fact.
241 (Kan. 1966).

McElhaney v. Rouse, 415 P.2d

See also, Turner v. Silver, 587 P.2d 969

(N.M. 1978); General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah
440, 243 P.2d 433 (1952).

The court failed to give such an

instruction although plaintiffs made such a request in
plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 30 (355).
The court's foregoing instructions, or failures to
instruct, when taken together improperly and incompletely
instructed the jury.

When added to the court's finding that

Talbot was negligent as a matter of law, the court's overall
instructions improperly led the jury to its conclusion.
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POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PLAINTIFFS'
EXHIBITS NO. 42 AND 43.
Plaintiffs offered into evidence Exhibits No. 42 and
43 (224).

These consisted of several relevant maintenance

records or invoices of the involved bus for the time period
subsequent to the accident, and a summary thereof (Exhibit
43, the Summary, is located at page 441-42 of the Record).
The court excluded both exhibits.

The court's exclusion of

these exhibits was error.
Plaintiffs offered these exhibits for the purpose of
demonstrating the possibility that the tail lights of the
bus were not functioning at the time of the accident.

This

possibility was disputed by defendants.
In Lawlor v. Flathead, 582 P.2d 751, 755 (Mont.
1978), the court held such evidence admissable for the
purpose of showing the existence of a condition:
It is the general rule that evidence of
subsequent repairs or precautions taken after an
accident or injury is inadmissible as proof of
negligence at the time of the accident or injury.
29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, §275. However, where the
evidence is not admitted as proof of negligence
but, rather, to establish the physical conditions
existing at the time of the accident such evidence
may be properly admitted.
Defendants presented evidence that the bus' tail
lights were working when Linda Charlesworth Marx boarded
the bus in North Ogden, several miles from the accident
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scene (807).

Loosemore testified that he turned on the

"flashers" after the accident.

Yet, plaintiffs presented

several witnesses who testified that, at the time of the
accident and immediately thereafter, there were no lights
on the bus. 8 Chief Carrol testified that there were no
lights when he arrived at the scene minutes after the accident, but that after he started taking photographs the lights
came on (504-0S).
Under these facts it was relevant to show subsequent
electrical failures to demonstrate that there could have
been such a failure at the time of the accident.
The proposed exhibits showed, in part, that in May,
1977, just over two months after the accident, the turn

signals were out.
the headlights.
out.

In September, 1977, there was a short in
In October, 1977, the turn signals were

In January, 1978, the right turn signal failed.

February, 1978, no turn signals.

In

In March, 1978, no turn

signals; two bad connections repaired.

The very next day,

the turn signals were out again; the mechanic repaired
grounded wires (441-42).
8

See Point I, infra. The braking maneuver
and his setting of the parking brake when
bus should have activated the tail lights
relevant, unless a short or other failure

of Loosemore,
he exited the
at all times
intervened.
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The foregoing repeated problems are evidence that a
short or other problem could have existed at the time of the
accident, resulting in the tail lights not functioning.
Defendants adamantly denied such possibility.
In Circle K Corp. v. Rosenthal, 574 P.2d 856 (Ariz.
1977), the court allowed similar evidence, holding that "the
rule is well established that evidence of a particular fact
before or after an act in question may be shown to indicate
the existence of that same condition at the time of the
accident."

Id. at 860.

The same conclusion was reached in Huxol v. Nickell,
473 P.2d 90 (Kan. 1970).
An additional ground was urged by plaintiffs at trial in
support of the offered exhibits -- that the subsequent existence of electrical problems was evidence that the defendants
had notice of the defect.

In Phoenix v. Boggs, 403 P.2d 305

(Ariz. 1965), the court reached the same conclusion as Lawlor,
Circle K, and Huxol, supra.

As an additional ground for

admitting the evidence of subsequent conduct, the court in
Boggs stated:
However, even if we assume simply for the sake
of argument, that defendant is correct in its contention that the evidence introduced was inadmissible to show what actually caused the injury, we
would still be disposed to affirm the lower court's
decision to admit this same evidence in order to
show the prior and subsequent condition of Golden
Lane which should have put the City of Phoenix on
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notice that one of its streets was in a dangerous
condition. That such is the law cannot be doubted.
As the jury found no negligence on the part of the
defendants, they must have determined that the tail lights
of the bus were operating.

See Instruction No. 12 (251).

Plaintiffs' proposed maintenance exhibits were relevant
evidence that the tail lights might not have been working at the time of the accident, and that defendant Utah
Transit Authority had notice of said defect.

Therefore,

the court erred in excluding plaintiffs' Exhibits No. 42
and 43.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in:
1.

Ruling Talbot negligent as a matter of law;

2.

Refusing to rule defendant Loosemore negligent

as a matter of law;
3.

Improperly instructing the jury in its Instruc-

tion No. 14;
4.

Over-emphasizing defendants' case, or improperly

or incompletely instructing the jury; and
5.

Excluding Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 42 and 43.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse
the Judgment of the trial court.
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DATED this

~day

of August, 1980.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ByPa~~zb~

Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000
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